So when all else fails, and there are tanks in the streets, you better know how to vote from the rooftops.

Gold has been debated for many years among investors.

In addition to having said many things about HFT in general in the last year, over the past 12 months Zero Hedge has focused a lot of attention specifically on Goldmans dominance of the NYSEs Program Trading platform, where in addition to recent entrant GETCO, it has been to date an explicit monopolist of the so-called Supplementary Liquidity Provider program, a role which affords the company greater liquidity rebates for, well providing liquidity (more on this below), and generating who knows what other possible front market-looking, flow-prop integration (presumably legal) benefits. Yesterday, Goldmans SLP function was non-existent. One wonders – was the Goldman SLP team in fact liquidity taking, or to put it bluntly, among the main reasons for the market collapse. We are confident the SEC will aggressively pursue this line of questioning as they attempt to justify their $1 billion porn download budget. We are also confident, that should the SEC truly take its role of protectors of investor interest seriouslyfor once, it will uncover such criminality and corruption at the level of trading integration of open exchange and ATS venues (and the but its so complicated – lets just leave it untouched because nobody understands it excuse is not flying any more), that it will make Goldmans CDO criminal and civil case seems like a dimestore misdemeanor. We have written about 1,000 posts about this. Readers are welcome to go back through our archives and acquaint themselves with the NYSEs SLP program, with Goldmans domination of program trading, with Goldmans domination of dark trading venues via the Sigma X suite, with Goldmans domination of flow trading via Redi X, and with Goldmans domination of virtually every vertical of the capital markets, which would be terrific if monopolies were encouraged in the US. Alas (last time we checked with the DOJ), they are not. Which is why we ask, for the nthtime, when will the anti-trust division of the DOJ finally dismantle the biggest market monopolist in the history of capital markets.

First, as a reminder, here isthe most recently disclosed NYSE program trading data:

What is notable here is that of the 1.4 billion in principal shares, or shares traded for the firms own account, Goldman was the top trader by a margin of over 100% compared to the second biggest program trader.

We have long claimed that Goldman is thede factomonopolist of the NYSEs program trading platform. As such, it is certainly the case that Goldman was instrumental in either a) precipitating yesterdays crash or b) not providing the critical liquidity which it is required to do, when the time came. There are no other options.

We will gladly work with any Attorney General to provide them all the critical data and questions they need to build a criminal case, or in the DOJs case, an anti-trust case.

And there is lots of data. For those unfamiliar with the NYSEs SLP operation (which was supposed to be long-extinct, yet continue pluhging along in good times, but disappearing in bad), and Goldmans domination of program trading, we republish in its entirey a post we wrote in May of 2009, titledObservations on NYSE Program Trading.

Recently, there has been quite a bit of discussion of Goldman Sachs principal program trading dominance in the NYSE, culminating with none other than Goldman Sachs themselves providing their perspective on the matter, via spokesman Ed Canaday:

The NYSE report that Zero Hedge discussed shows Goldman Sachs trading over 1 billion shares in the principal program trading category. What the table doesnt show, but a deeper look at the numbers reveals is that the vast majority of this total is trades by our quantitative trading desk. This desk is participating in a relatively newNYSE programcalled Supplemental Liquidity Providers. The NYSE started the program to attract liquidity to the exchange. As an SLP, this the desk makes markets in NYSE stocks. They often do high-frequency trading (which is simply auto-quote market making) where they send out hundreds of baskets of stocks at one time. Program trading, as defined by the NYSE report is any strategy that sends out a basket of 15+stocks at one time. I am happy to discuss this with you if that description doesnt make sense.

In order to dig deeper into Canadays statement, Zero Hedge performed a historical analysis of NYSE Program Trading (PT) data (which is public) and came up with some curious observations. But before I get into the results, it makes sense to evaluate the facts behind Goldmans retort and in order to do that, lets first observe just what this Supplemental Liquidity Provider program is.

The NYSEs most recent classification of the three main market participantsis as follows:

Designated Market Makers (DMMs) are at the center of the NYSE market and are the only participants in any market who have true accountability for maintaining a fair and orderly market. DMMs:

Convene both a physical auction convened by DMMs and a completely automated auction that includes algorithmic quotes from DMMs and other market participants;

Have the obligation to maintain an orderly market in their stocks, quote at the national best bid or offer a specified percentage of the time, and facilitate price discovery at the open, close and in periods of significant imbalances;

Provide price improvement and match incoming orders based on a pre-programmed Capital Commitment Schedule, which has been added to the NYSE Display Book, minimizing order latency. DMMs and their algorithms do not receive a look at incoming orders. This ensures that an intermediary does not see orders first, and that DMMs compete as a market participant;

Brokers on the NYSE Trading Floor leverage their physical point-of sale-presence with information technologies and algorithmic tools to offer customers the benefits of flexibility, judgment, automation and anonymity with minimal market impact. Trading Floor Brokers:

Have parity with DMMs and the NYSE Display Book, no matter whether the Brokers order is represented physically or via an algorithm or e-Quote. That is, they can join the first displayed quote on the Book, and split stock with that order.

Have the ability to route all or part of a customer order to an external algo engine from their handheld order-management device. These algorithms offer Floor Brokers the ability to provide customers with additional execution capabilities in an environment that offers a balanced combination of technology for fast, automated and anonymous order execution; and a physical marketplace for discovering block-sized liquidity and improving prices.

Can utilize a technology feature called Block Talk to more efficiently locate deep liquidity. Block Talk is designed allow Floor Brokers to broadcast and subscribe to specific stocks they have an interest in, creating an opportunity to trade block-sized liquidity that is not accessible electronically. Since the messages contain no specific order information, customers benefit from a discovery process in a secure environment free of impact, information leakage or intermediation.

Also have the ability to identify via their hand-held order-management system the last five buyers and sellers in a stock by badge number. They can message a specific member that they are in touch with the contra side. This is valuable information for pricing blocks, as it is about real buyers and sellers, not indications of interest.

Have a special feature with their reserve orders: when the displayed amount is exhausted, reserve interest replenishes on parity. In contrast, the upstairs reserve order functions as it does in an electronic market: replenishing at the back of the queue.

Are positioned to act on the expanded imbalance and indication information at the open and close of the market. They can participate as agent, or convey insight into the open or close for customers decision making.

And most relevantly,Supplemental Liquidity Providers

Supplemental Liquidity Providers (SLPs) are upstairs, electronic, high-volume membersincented to add liquidityon the NYSE.

SLPs are obligated to maintain a bid or offer at the National Best Bid or Offer (NBBO) in each assigned security at least 5 percent of the trading day.

The NYSE pays a financial rebate to the SLP when the SLP posts liqui

dity in an assigned security that executes against incoming orders.

This generates more quoting activity, leading to tighter spreads and greater liquidity at each price level.

It is important to note that the SLP rebate is $0.0015, usually less than half of the rebate plain vanilla Designated Market Makers receive, which isbetween $0.0030 and $0.0035,and as the NYSE plainly says, a member organization cannot act as a DMM and SLP in the same security. Obviously based on the rebate structure and the mutual exclusion, it would make much more sense to trade as a DMM as opposed to an SLP, not in the least since SLPs (at least according to currently available information) are very limited in terms of which securities they can actually trade for supplemental liquidity provision.Quoting Robert Airo, VP of relationshipmanagement and sales at NYSE Euronext, from late October 2008:

Were rolling [the SLP pilot program] out in the 500 most active names where we believe incenting SLPs by compensating them to provide liquidity will supplement all of the other initiatives that weve put in place to build the NYSE book.

The SLP program was developed in the days after the Lehmancollapse when market volatility spiked and major questions about liquidity premia emerged, resulting in program roll out on October 29 of 2008. The full SEC filing describing the minutae of the program is presented below:

SLP quoting will provide more liquidity and should make the NYSE more competitive. We have begun to see significant shifts in terms of the frequency with which the NYSE is at the NBBO, and we expect increases in volume and market share to follow.

With a mere 500 securities to work with, especially being excluded from being a DMM in SLP names, maybe Canaday can explain the economics to GS program trading desk from participating in the SLP?

Another relevant question is just who are the current SLPs? It seems the answer is difficult to pin point. It is known for a fact that Goldman Sachs and Spear, Leeds and Kellogg (owned by GS) are currently definitive SLPs, with Knight Trading and Barclays also presumably becoming SLPs as well, but there has been no confirmation either way, potentially implying that Goldman could have a monopoly in liquidity provisioning. If the program is truly as attractive as GS spokesman makes it seem, why are other major equity players not clamoring to participate in it? After all, the benefits to SLPs are obvious.

Following up on that, has there been an extension of the SLP program recently? Zero Hedge has not heard of one. The SLP, which was approved in late October (see above) was, this last Thursday: The proposed pilot program will commence on the date upon which the SEC will approve the New Market Model and will continue for six months thereafter ending on April 30, 2009. If the SLP is now over, should one expect GSs principal volume trading to drop dramatically, if, as Canaday says, the volume is mostly SLP driven? Also, does that mean volatility in the market is about to spike as there are no entities (well, one entity) providing NBB and NBOs?

Indeed, many questions arise when one digs into the nebulous world of NYSE liquidity providers, many more than there are clear cut answers to. Perhaps it is time for Mr. Canaday to address as many of these questions as possible head on. Zero Hedge would be happy to provide him with a forum for clarification.

In the meantime, here are the facts, courtesy of the NYSEs public record keeping system.

The first chart below demonstrates total program trading in the NYSE since mid August, a month before the Lehman bankruptcy. The black line demonstrates total indicated program trading, which absent volatility, has remained relatively stable, averaging roughly 4 billion shares weekly. And while most other NYSE member firms have seen their PT volumes stay relatively flat as well, GS has seen a dramatic ramp up, controlling about 15% of PT in Q3 of 2008 which has risen to almost a quarter of all NYSE PT over the past quarter.

But while total Program Trading includes Principal trading (i.e., trading not on behalf of its clients but for its own benefit; this is the category where SLP would also fall in under NYSE guidelines), as well as Facilitation and Agency trades, the big surprise arises when one looks at a historical analysis of merely Principal trading. The chart below pulls only the Principal trading data for the top 10 NYSE members. And like before, while the total amount of total Principal trading as a portion of NYSE PT has stayed relatively flat, at about half of total PT volumes, Goldmans share hasexplodedover the past six months: while GS was responsible for around 27% of Principal NYSE stock trading in Q3 and most of Q4,that number has risen to the low 50% range over the past 3 months.

The last two charts demonstrate the divergence of Principal trading as a fraction of total PT by any given broker. It is obvious that while the majority of top NYSE member firms have had Principal trades stay around 40% of their total PT volume, Goldman has seen its share of Principal trading go from 60% all the way into 90%: a vast majority of all its trades are merely for its own benefit (and potentially as an SLP funnel).

And lastly, demonstrating Non-Principal trading indicates, as expected, a trend where GS client have taken a progressively smaller relative role as part of its total PT, and currently GS Agency volume as a % of Total PT is thelowestof all top NYSE brokers, with total NYSE Agency volume remaining relatively stable.

So what is really going on here? Connecting the dots is difficult with so little freely available information, and the NYSE seems to be keeping mum on disclosing anything above the absolute minimum when it comes to the SLP, and brokers participation in it.

My interest was piqued by one of the points Canaday brought up: What the table doesnt show, but a deeper look at the numbers reveals is that the vast majority of this totalis trades by our quantitative trading desk.Maybe Canaday can expand on this a little more, as it is public knowledge that recently the heads of GSAM and Goldman Global Alpha left the company: Ray Iwanowski and Mark Carhart, who ran the quant operation, and Giorgio De Santis who ran research, areno longer at the company. Their departures in themselves are not surprising considering Global Alpha lost over 80% of assets or roughly $10 billion in the course of 2008 (precipitated by thequant shakeout of August 2007). But is there something else going on here? Their departures occurred at the end of March, just as Goldmans Principal % of total NYSE trades had peaked at almost 55%, yet when they departed, this number dropped by a not insignificant 12% to 43%, only to rebound promptly thereafter. Is there more here than meets the eye?

As regular readers of Zero Hedge know, the topic of market liquidity has been a major one over the past 3 weeks, and I have demonstrated that traditional market neutral, high-frequency quants, aka independent liquidity providers have not only sufferedsignificant P&L lossesin April, but have deleveraged to a point where their presence in the market is negligible, resulting in dramatic volatility spikes on low volume. Could it be that Goldman is singlehandedly benefitting from being the liquidity provider of last resort, even more so as there are virtually no other participants in the SLP program? And, as is expected, with a liquidity monopoly, come unprecedented opportunities to take advantage of this, depending on ones view of the market. Of course, Zero Hedge is not suggesting Goldman has done this, but in a world where so little transparency exists into the core workings of the equity market, which most market traders have been clamoring has a very fishy feel about it, with Hard To Borrow notices appearing for such major index hedging securities as the SPY and IWR, it is no wonder that explanations are being sought.

In order to provide some much needed visibility, Zero Hedge, as noted above, is hoping Mr. Canaday will approach Zero Hedge and give a more elaborate explanation of what is really happing, and why GS is dominating NYSE program trading, which lately has become a major percentage of total NYSE volume. It is easy to see why market participants could be concerned about this particular breed of opacity. In the meantime, I will continue presenting NYSE program data, as it is everybodys right to be caught up with all the facts.

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